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Abstract 
 
The proposed 2008 TARP auction was intended to facilitate rapid purchases by the U.S. 
department of Treasury of a wide array of mortgage-backed securities in order to remove 
these “toxic assets” from the portfolios of financially stressed banks.  The Treasury had 
selected a Reference Price design whereby bids to sell different securities would be 
normalized or “scored” by reference prices that reflect estimates of relative values.  
Although the auction was suspended just prior to the 2008 Presidential election, we 
continued with a series of laboratory experiments aimed at evaluating the performance of 
Reference Price auctions relative to several benchmark conditions. The experimental 
results indicate that a simple Reference Price auction can be an effective mechanism for 
avoiding serious effects of adverse selection and strategic bid manipulation, even when 
reference prices are not set accurately.  An econometric analysis of bidding patterns and 
auction outcomes reveals how underlying behavior produces efficiency differences in this 
common-value framework.  
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I. Introduction  
 
In the fall of 2008, as the financial crisis reached a critical stage, the U.S. Treasury 
(hereafter Treasury) was setting up a series of auctions in order to purchase diverse 
mortgage backed securities (hereafter MBS) from financial institutions. With a budget of 
up to $700 billion, this would have been the largest auction in history, surpassing even 
the largest spectrum auctions by a factor of 10.1  Since no appropriate “off-the-shelf” 
design existed for this purpose, a new auction format had to be rapidly developed.   The 
scale of the proposed auction and the immediacy of the crisis generated considerable 
discussion among economists (e.g., Varian, 2008; Brusco; 2008, Ausubel and Cramton, 
2008).2  After consulting with academic experts, the Treasury selected a new design, a 
“Reference Price” auction.  It was unclear, however, how this design would perform. In 
this paper, we report on an experiment aimed at testing the basic Reference Price auction 
adopted by the Treasury, as well as comparing how alternative features may provide 
some protection against bidders possibly exploiting the buyer’s inferior information about 
security values. 
 
The design of an auction to purchase MBS as part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(or TARP) presented a number of unique challenges, including: 
 
1. Dimensionality: The universe of possible MBS eligible for purchase by the 
Treasury was extremely large. In particular, within the realm of residential MBS 
alone, there were more than 23,000 distinct securities. Likewise, the auction had 
to be designed to accommodate a large number of bidders (possibly in the 
hundreds). 
2. Heterogeneity: MBS are highly heterogeneous as they can differ along several 
observed and unobserved dimensions, including their ratings, the vintages of the 
underlying mortgages, the locations and/or the amounts of the mortgages, the 
characteristics of the borrowers (e.g. credit ratings), the mortgage delinquency 
rates, and the originators of the loans. The ratings assigned by credit agencies to 
MBS were supposed to capture these differences, but many observers at that point 
in time believed that the ratings had ceased to reflect the securities’ actual risks 
and values.3  
3. Valuation: At the time the auction was designed, there was virtually no market 
for most MBS that the Treasury was considering for purchase, and hence no price 
information. Moreover, the unprecedented rate of commercial and residential 
foreclosures over the preceding year made it hazardous to rely on standard 
simulation models to value these securities. 4 
                                                 
1  Spectrum auctions have been conducted by various governments around the world to assign 
electromagnetic spectra’s licenses for mobile phones service (see e.g. Binmore and Klemperer 2002). 
2  Numerous economists also questioned the appropriateness of purchasing illiquid mortgage related 
securities. See e.g. the open letter signed by more than 100 economists sent to Congress on September 24, 
2008 (http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/Papers/mortgage_protest.htm). 
3  See e.g. “Triple A Failure,” New York Times, April 27, 2008, (http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/04/27/magazine/27Credit-t.html). 
4 See e.g. “Paulson Seeks Mortgage Value That Eluded Bear, Lehman,” Bloomberg, September 24, 2008 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=home&sid=aGT_xTYzbbQE). 
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4. Informational Asymmetry: Security owners could be assumed to have access to 
better information about the underlying MBS values than outside analysts and 
prospective buyers (e.g., by observing repayment streams and borrower default 
rates).  
5. Concentration of Ownership: A single financial institution could own most 
shares of a specific security, thereby creating a thin market problem. Although the 
extent of the problem was unknown, it was believed to apply to many of the 
securities under consideration (Swagel 2009).   
6. Time Constraints: The time constraints were threefold. First, as the Treasury 
initially considered conducting the first auction within a matter of weeks, the 
auction had to be designed, tested, and explained to bidders under considerable 
time pressure. In addition, a platform to submit bids and to effectively settle the 
winning tenders had to be developed immediately. Second, for any given auction, 
the bidding process needed to be completed in a short time frame so as to avoid 
outside influence and possible sellers’ regret.5 Third, once initiated, the program 
needed to have a significant and immediate impact to restore market confidence. 
 
The Treasury realized that it might not be able to fully address all of these challenges. In 
particular, it understood that in the presence of asymmetric information, it is often 
difficult to avoid inefficiencies (Swagel 2009). The goal then became to rapidly design a 
simple yet robust auction that would effectively mitigate possible adverse consequences.  
Two simple auction formats were quickly abandoned. The first was a “Grand Auction,” 
whereby different securities would be pooled together in a single procurement (reverse) 
auction and purchased at a single price, irrespective of the type of security accepted. A 
perceived advantage of this approach was that it could promote competition by letting 
owners of different securities compete against each other in a single auction. However, 
because of heterogeneity and informational asymmetry problems, theory suggests that 
adverse selection could be severe in a simple, simultaneous, multi-item auction. With low 
bids likely to come in for the more “toxic” assets, it was believed that the Treasury would 
end up purchasing the lowest-quality securities.  This outcome would not necessarily be a 
problem unless it involved large overpayments by the Treasury, which was likely to be 
the case in a simple multi-item auction. The second format to be ruled out was a security-
by-security auction. This approach would effectively deal with the unobserved value 
heterogeneity, as a separate auction would be conducted for each of the thousands of 
securities. Because of the problems of dimensionality, ownership concentration, and time 
constraints, however, this approach was considered not only impractical but also 
undesirable. 
 
In essence, the design the Treasury selected is a version of what is known in the literature 
as a “scoring auction,” in which bids with heterogeneous characteristics are homogenized 
through the use of a score that incorporates both price and quality or other non-price 
                                                 
5 Given the high market volatility at the time, it was feared that bidding could be influenced by sudden 
market developments if the bidding process was to last for more than a few minutes. Conversely, concerns 
were expressed about the possibility that financial markets could be affected or manipulated during the 
auction process. 
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dimensions of the bids.6 As further explained in section III, the non-price dimension for 
the TARP auction was to be based on “reference price” estimates of the relative values of 
the MBS.  It was believed that the main benefit of this design is that it could deal with the 
dimensionality problem while promoting competition and providing some protection 
against adverse selection. In addition, although undoubtedly sub-optimal in the formal 
mechanism design sense, it was deemed simple, transparent, and robust enough to be 
implemented rapidly and effectively. The Treasury team in charge of designing the 
auction, however, realized that the performance of this design may rely heavily on its 
ability to precisely estimate reference prices. As such an exercise could not be conducted 
without making mistakes, concerns were expressed about the possibility that bidders 
could exploit these mistakes at the Treasury’s expense. Several remedies were proposed 
to mitigate such a problem. In particular, it was suggested that the Treasury would only 
reveal reference prices after the auction, so that the bidders would not be in a position to 
observe the Treasury’s valuation errors at the time bids are submitted. 
  
Given the complexity of the environment, the relevant issues could not be addressed 
directly with economic theory.  A commonly used procedure in such situations is to 
conduct a laboratory experiment that simulates the environment with financially 
motivated human subjects. 7 The objective of the experiment conducted in this paper is 
threefold. First, we want to test whether a Reference Price auction performs better (from 
the buyer’s perspective) than a Grand Auction when the buyer set the reference prices 
accurately. Second, we want to explore how sensitive the Reference Price auction is to 
reference prices that are incorrectly set by the buyer. More specifically, we want to test 
whether announcing noisy (instead of accurate) reference prices before the auction 
generates inefficiencies, as bidders are in a position to exploit mistakes made by the 
buyer. Third, we want to test one of the measures proposed to protect the Treasury 
                                                 
6 For instance, for its construction projects, the European Spatial Agency asks bidders to submit proposals 
consisting of a price and a quality. The bids are then ranked according to a score equal to the ratio of 
quality to bid price (Armantier, Florens and Richard 1998, Armantier 1999).  A similar approach was 
implemented in the Victoria Bush Tender Auction, in which a government agency first estimated a 
“biodiversity index” for land management conservation actions that were proposed by participating 
farmers.  The auction was cleared by accepting bids with the highest biodiversity-per-dollar ratios, and then 
moving down the list until the limited purchase budget was exhausted (Stoneham, et al. 2002).  See Cason, 
Gangadharan, and Duke (2003) for a laboratory study in which the bids were scored by a measure of 
environmental benefit. Scoring auctions are used in a majority of states for highway construction contracts, 
with the score being a weighted average of the bid price and the road user cost of time delay.  This linear 
scoring method is known as “A + B bidding.”  See Asker and Cantillon (2008) for a theoretical analysis of 
linear scoring auctions and for references to applications that range from electricity reserve supply to public 
procurement in the European Union. 
7 See Plott (2001) and Holt, Shobe, and Smith (2007) for surveys of the use of laboratory experiments to 
guide public policy initiatives, including auctions.  The auction design team for the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI) relied on an extensive set of experiments in making their recommendations, which 
were implemented almost immediately (Holt, et al., 2008).  Laboratory experiments were also used to test 
the combinatorial component of the 700 MHZ Federal Communications Commission spectrum auction 
conducted in early 2008.  In fact, the particular “hierarchical package bidding” procedure that was used 
there had never been implemented outside of a laboratory before it was used in a multi-billion dollar 
auction (Goeree and Holt, 2008a).  A reverse auction for irrigation permits in south Georgia was patterned 
after a design that had been tested in a series of experiments involving both farmers and students 
(Cummings, Holt, and Laury, 2004).     
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against the mistakes made in setting reference prices.  Namely, we test whether the 
Reference Price auction produces more efficient outcomes when the noisy reference 
prices are kept secret at the time of bidding instead of being announced in advance.8  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the extraordinary 
environment in which the auction was conceived. The Reference Price auction is 
explained in Section III. Section IV details the experimental procedures used to compare 
parallel series of laboratory test auctions, using financially motivated bidders.  Section V 
summarizes the main results of these experiments, in terms of purchase efficiency 
(defined as the value of securities purchased relative to government expenditures) and 
price discovery (auction clearing prices relative to unobserved security values).  In 
Section VI, the causes of performance differences are investigated with an econometric 
analysis of bidding behavior and auction outcomes.  Section VII presents robustness 
checks in which the relevant treatments are re-run using alternative earnings and 
reference price procedures.  The final section contains a discussion of extensions and 
alternative applications of auctions for heterogeneous items. 
 
 
II. Setting the Stage 
 
In early September of 2008, the adverse consequences of the subprime crisis spread and 
deepened at an alarming pace.9 On September 7, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two 
cornerstones in the securitization of mortgages, were placed under conservatorship by 
their regulator (the Federal Housing Financial Agency). Half of the remaining U.S. 
investment banks ceased to exist on September 15, as Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of 
America, while Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection. The Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy, the largest in U.S. history,10 set off what had been described as a devastating 
tidal wave that immediately sliced through the entire financial system.11 Two days later, 
the Federal Reserve loaned $85 billion to AIG. In spite of a record injection of $180 
billion in liquidity by central banks around the world, the situation became critical on 
September 18: interbank credit markets nearly collapsed, money market funds 
experienced an unprecedented run which was reported to exceed half a trillion dollars,12 
while the commercial paper market was on verge of dislocation (Kacperczyk and Schnabl 
                                                 
8 Note that we take no position as to whether or not purchasing mortgage related securities was at the time 
an appropriate strategy to address the financial crisis.  
9 For an inside view of the events that led to the creation of the TARP, see the account by former Assistant 
Treasury Secretary Philipp Swagel (2009). 
10 “Lehman folds with record $613 billion debt,” Marketwatch, Sept 15, 2008 (http://www.marketwatch 
.com/news/story/story.aspx?guid={2FE5AC05-597A-4E71-A2D5-9B9FCC290520}&siteid=rss). 
11  “President Obama Goes to Wall Street,” Nightly Business Report, PBS, September 14, 2009 
(http://www.pbs.org/nbr/site/onair/transcripts/president_obama_sends_a_message_to_wall_street_090914/). 
12 Congressman Paul Kanjorski, Capital Market Subcommittee Chair, C-Span interview on January 27, 
2009. (http://www.cspan.org/Watch/Media/2009/01/27/HP/A/14757/Rep+Paul+Kanjorski+DPA+Chairman 
+of +the+Capitol+Markets+Subcmte.aspx). 
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2010).13 At this point, some observers felt that the financial system was on the edge of a 
precipice and could completely melt down in a matter of days.14 
 
On the evening of September 18, then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke met with members of Congress. The atmosphere in the 
meeting has been described as grave and somber.15 Secretary Paulson presented a plan 
aimed at creating a “firewall” to stop the crisis from spreading from the weakest financial 
institution to the next. Instead of acting on a case-by-case basis, the plan called for a bold, 
comprehensive approach to attack what was perceived to be the root of the crisis.16 More 
specifically, Secretary Paulson proposed to purchase $700 billion in mortgage related 
securities that were believed to clog the overall flow of credit to financial institutions, 
corporations, and consumers. The rationale was that the virtual collapse of the market for 
mortgage related securities had made it extremely difficult to value these securities, and 
by extension, the financial institutions that owned them. This increased uncertainty was 
perceived to be the main reason behind the reluctance of market participants to loan and 
trade with one another. The hope was that removing these illiquid assets from banks’ 
balance sheets would restore confidence and jumpstart financial markets.17 
 
On September 20, the Treasury submitted a three page draft proposal which, after being 
substantially amended, was rejected in the House of Representatives on September 29.18 
The Dow Jones Industrial Average immediately lost $1.2 trillion in market value (1.7 
times more than the TARP bill), or 777 points (the largest single-day point drop in its 
history).19 Congress then further amended the bill, which swelled to more than 400 pages 
and $850 billion.  When the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act was finally signed 
into law on October 3,20 however, it was unclear how the mortgage related securities 
would be acquired from banks and at what price. For MBS, a reverse (“low bids win”) 
auction had been mentioned (e.g. in the September 29 bill), as it was perceived to be an 
efficient and transparent mechanism for determining prices when markets are not 
functioning. Such an approach had been successfully adopted in the late 1980’s during 
                                                 
13 Commercial paper is used by corporations to meet short term funding needs to finance (e.g.) payroll or 
rent. For a reference see “As Credit Crisis Spiraled, Alarm Led to Action,” NY Times, October 2, 2008 
(http://travel.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/business/02crisis.html). 
14 See e.g. Paul Krugman’s PBS interview on January 17, 2009 (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
meltdown/interviews/krugman.html). 
15 Chairman Bernanke was reported as saying to a member of Congress: “If we don't do this, we may not 
have an economy on Monday” (“As Credit Crisis Spiraled, Alarm Led to Action,” NY Times, Oct 2, 2008). 
Senator C. Dodd, the chairman of the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee remarked: “We are 
literally maybe days away from a complete meltdown of our financial system”. Senator C. Schumer 
recounted: “When you listened to him describe it, you gulped.” See “Congressional Leaders Stunned by 
Warnings,” NY Times, Sept 20, 2008, (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/20/washington/19cnd-cong.html). 
16 Testimony by Secretary H. Paulson before the Senate Banking Committee on Turmoil in U.S. Credit 
Markets: “Recent Actions regarding Government Sponsored Entities, Investment Banks and other Financial 
Institutions,” September 23, 2008 (http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1153.htm). 
17 Statement by Secretary H. Paulson, Sept 19, 2008 (http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1149.htm). 
18 The initial proposal may be found here: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21draftcnd.html, 
and various drafts of the bill may be found here: http://www.govtrack.us/special/econstimbill/changes.xpd.  
19  “U.S. House Rejects $700 Billion Financial-Rescue Plan,” Bloomberg, September 29, 2008 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aeqvQcX6sRe4). 
20 The bill may be found here: http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/109hr3997ai.pdf 
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the “Saving and Loans Crisis” to purchase distressed real estate. 21  As many noted, 
however, MBS are complex securities that are different from real estate, and doubts were 
immediately expressed about the effectiveness of such a straightforward reverse auction 
in the current context.22 Since there was no ready-to-use procedure that would fit the 
Treasury’s needs, a new type of auction needed to be designed without delay. 
 
On Saturday, September 20, a team at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York proposed 
to the Treasury a basic structure for government purchases of large numbers of MBS 
through a reverse auction based on reference prices (Armantier and Vickery 2008).  In 
the week that followed, the Treasury also contacted academics with experience in 
designing auctions from the ground up. These experts were grouped into four teams that 
developed separate proposals. The Treasury selected a reference price design submitted 
by Jacob Goeree and Charles Holt (2008b), and decided to associate them with Charlie 
Plott to refine their design and incorporate elements he had suggested.23  
 
This basic reference price design, however, had not been tested, and it was not clear how 
it would perform. In such situations, it is becoming increasingly common to use 
laboratory experiments to test and refine the design of specific auction procedures.24  We 
began the process of setting up experiments in mid-October of 2008, just weeks before 
the design consultants were told to “take a vacation” (which presumably meant that the 
auction was on hold, although an official announcement was not ready at that time).  On 
November 12, the Treasury officially announced that it had abandoned its plan for the 
TARP auction. Instead, it decided to use the funds allocated by Congress to take an 
equity position in several banks. Secretary Paulson explained that the situation had 
changed and that capital injections were now a more effective approach to address the 
situation faced by the financial system.25  
 
 
III. The Auction Design Adopted 
 
Although it did not have what economists would characterize as a well defined objective 
function, the Treasury had specific priorities and concerns when designing the new 
TARP auction. Starting from the first draft submitted to Congress on September 29, the 
TARP bill stated that the objectives of the purchase program were i) stabilizing financial 
                                                 
21 “Lesson from savings and loans rescue”, Financial Times, September 24, 2008. 
22 See e.g. Varian (2008), Brusco (2008), or Ausubel and Cramton (2008). 
23 Decisions about the selection of the auction design were made entirely by the Treasury. Employees from 
the Federal Reserve only acted in an advisory capacity. Jacob Goeree, Charles Holt and Charlie Plott were 
put under contract by the Bank of New York Mellon (the auction custodian hired by the Treasury) to 
provide advice regarding the design and the implementation of the Reference Price auction. 
24 The experimental study that is the most relevant for the Treasury’s TARP program is that of Cason, 
Gangadharan, and Duke (2003), who score bids for land conservation on the basis of a measure of 
environmental benefit.  One major difference from the Treasury situation, however, was that the 
environmental benefit primarily mattered to the government purchaser, whereas security values matter to 
both sellers and the government purchaser of MBS. 
25 See “Remarks by Secretary H. Paulson, Jr. on Financial Rescue Package and Economic Update,” 
November 12, 2008 (http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1265.htm). 
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markets, and ii) protecting the taxpayer. So, although the primary objective was first and 
foremost to remove the illiquid MBS from the banks’ balance sheets, the Treasury also 
realized it needed to strike a delicate balance between overpaying for the securities 
(which would harm taxpayers) and underpaying (which would harm financial 
institutions).26 The goal was therefore to design an auction yielding a price between what 
was described as the “fire sale price,” at which some of these assets were traded at the 
time, and the “hold to maturity price” which reflects the stream of mortgage revenues a 
patient investor would receive at maturity.27 Additional objectives were also considered, 
e.g., price discovery and provision of bank liquidity. Although recognized as important 
and considered when designing the auction, these additional objectives were not deemed 
to be first-order priorities.28  
 
We now describe the basic features of the auction design the Treasury selected, and how 
it might have been implemented.29 A series of 20 to 30 different auctions was expected to 
be conducted, each at a different date. A few days before a given auction, Treasury 
officials would ask eligible bidders to indicate how many shares of each of a pre-
announced set of (say 1,000) securities they would be willing to sell.30 For each security, 
a bidder would not be allowed to submit a bid to sell a quantity that exceeded what was 
listed in this “nomination” phase. In addition, the Treasury was considering asking 
participating bidders not to buy or sell any of the securities they listed during the interval 
between the nomination phase and the completion of the auction. The Treasury would 
select a subset of securities (e.g., 500) to be included in this particular auction, and it 
would decide on a total purchase budget. These decisions would be based in part on 
information obtained from the nomination process. For instance, the Treasury could 
decide not to purchase more than 50% of the face value of the assets nominated. 
 
The “reference prices” would be set so as to reflect estimates of the values of the various 
securities relative to a baseline security. A security with a reference price of (e.g.) 2 
would therefore be deemed twice as valuable as the baseline security. Where possible, 
these reference prices would be calculated by combining the latest transactions data, 
                                                 
26 Observe that, because of the marked-to-market accounting practices in the U.S., underpayments by the 
Treasury would have hurt not only the banks that sold a given security, but also the banks that still owned 
shares of that security, as they most likely would have had to mark down the value of the security in their 
books. Given the fragility of the entire financial system at the time, such write-downs could have had 
severe consequences (see Swagel 2009). Thus, underpayment could involve a type of “externality” with an 
industry wide, negative impact. 
27 See B. Bernanke Sept 23, 2008 testimony to the Senate Banking Committee (http://banking.senate.gov / 
public/ index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=7a41ae9e-30b2-4d7f-8f1b-4ef2e8ae28f7). 
28 There was considerable doubt about the ability of an auction to reveal meaningful price information. In 
particular, with the $700 billion purchase budget being contemplated at that time, the Treasury was likely 
to substantially shift the demand function for these assets. 
29 This section borrows heavily from Armantier, Asker and Vickery  (2008). 
30 Eligibility restrictions (i.e. which institutions would be allowed to bid) were not handled by the team in 
charge of designing the auction. Likewise, the legislation required that firms selling assets through TARP 
should provide warrants to the government. The Treasury team was not asked to design an auction that 
would include warrants. The auction eligibility and the warrant issues are therefore not discussed here. 
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other market information (e.g. Markit ABX index),31 valuation models, expert opinions, 
and the outcomes of previous TARP auctions.  
 
Each participating institution would be allowed to submit (a possibly limited number) of 
sealed bids.32  Each bid consists of i) a unit price and ii) a number of units of a specific 
security. Each bid would then be normalized by dividing the unit price bid by the 
reference price corresponding to that security. As a result, the bids for different securities 
are homogenized and can be compared. For instance, bids on a security with a reference 
price of 2 would be divided by 2 in order to make them comparable to bids on the 
baseline security. The normalization process would therefore lower the price bid for 
securities with higher reference prices, and raise the price bid for securities with lower 
reference prices. 
 
The bids with the lowest normalized bids would be accepted first, moving up the list until 
the Treasury’s budget for the auction is exhausted. Under a discriminatory payment 
format, the winning bidders (i.e. those whose securities are purchased) would be paid 
their own bids. Instead, the Treasury opted for a uniform price auction, whereby all 
winning bidders for a given security would receive the same payment per unit.33 To 
determine this price, the “market clearing normalized price” (i.e. the lowest rejected 
normalized price bid) would first be calculated. This common cutoff normalized price, 
multiplied by the corresponding reference price, then determines the “market clearing 
price” per unit received by the winning bidders for a given security. For instance, imagine 
the highest accepted normalized bid is 5, and consider a security with a reference price of 
2. The owners of that security who submitted a bid below 10 (therefore corresponding to 
a normalized bid below 5) would sell their securities to the Treasury for a market clearing 
price of 5*2=10 per share. Observe that the market clearing price paid for a given 
security is the same, regardless of the winners’ bids, but the market clearing price paid 
for securities estimated to be less valuable (i.e. with a lower reference price) would be 
lower. For instance, the baseline security in the previous example (with a reference price 
                                                 
31 The ABX is a subprime residential mortgage backed credit derivative index offered by Markit since 2006. 
32 Some multi-round auction formats were also widely discussed in the press at the time (Ausubel and 
Cramton, 2008).  For example, a reverse “clock auction” could be set up so that bidders would indicate 
quantities they wish to sell at current clock prices, which would be reduced sequentially until requested 
sales no longer exceeded a government purchase budget.  One potential problem with clock auctions was 
the time required to complete a single auction, given the need to run many auctions per day with up to 100 
securities in each auction.  Another issue was the high volatility in the stock market in the fall of 2008, 
which could end up being the focus of news coverage of any ongoing auction. See also the discussion in 
footnote 2. 
33  Three arguments were mentioned in support of the uniform price format: i) It may provide some 
protection against the winner’s curse (as the bidders with the most extreme predictions would not be 
penalized as much since they will most likely receive a price exceeding their bids if their securities are 
purchased by the Treasury), ii) it may encourage participation from smaller or less informed bidders (who 
know that making a mistake may not be too costly since they are unlikely to set the market clearing price), 
and iii) it would generate a single market clearing price for each security, which might help with price 
discovery. The main argument in favor of the uniform price auction, however, was familiarity, as most 
financial institutions were experienced bidders under this format through Treasury auctions or the recently 
implemented “Term Auction Facility.” 
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of 1) would be purchased for a market clearing price of 5. The market clearing price for 
each security could then be announced in order to facilitate trading in secondary markets. 
 
The Treasury team realized that the effectiveness of this design may crucially rely on the 
ability to come up with reference prices that reflect the relative security values. Although 
estimating relative values of MBS was arguably easier than estimating absolute values,34 
we were confident this could not be done with perfect accuracy. Consequently, concerns 
were raised that bidders might exploit mispriced reference prices. To illustrate this 
possibility, consider a situation where the Treasury “overprices” a given security, i.e. the 
reference price is set above the actual relative value of the security. For instance, a 
reference price for a given security could incorrectly be set at 4 while its relative value is 
in fact 2. The bidders who own this security then possess an advantage compared to the 
owners of correctly priced securities. Indeed, all else equal, the normalized bids will be 
lower for this security (as they are incorrectly scored against a higher reference price), 
which make them more likely to be accepted in the auction. As a result, bidders may find 
it advantageous to exploit overpriced reference prices by submitting higher bids on those 
securities, which could be costly to the Treasury. 
 
Several measures were proposed to mitigate the problem of incorrect reference prices. 
One approach would be to set limits on how much of the total purchase budget would be 
allotted to a specific security (e.g. 50% of the security’s total face value in the nomination 
process). In addition, for a given security, the Treasury could decide not to purchase more 
than a certain number of shares from a given bidder. An alternative approach considered 
was to keep reference prices secret at the time of the auction. As a result, bidders would 
not be in a position to know and exploit mispriced securities. Finally, one aspect of the 
Holt and Goeree proposal involved reference prices that would be endogenized, i.e., 
modified ex-post as a result of the bids submitted.35  
 
The objective of the experiment described in the next section is to test i) how a Reference 
Price auction with accurate reference prices performs compared to a Grand Auction with 
unitary reference prices, ii) how purchase efficiency in a Reference Price auction with 
announced but noisy reference prices compares with the best and worst case benchmarks 
established in i), and iii) whether or not purchase efficiency is improved by keeping noisy 
reference prices secret at the time bids are submitted. 
 
 
IV. Experimental Procedures 
 
The experiment consists of 4 treatments. As explained below, these treatments essentially 
differ in two ways: i) the accuracy of reference prices used to score the bids and ii) 
                                                 
34 Some argued that MBS had been hit by a common unobserved macroeconomic shock. As a result, 
although the absolute values of MBS became highly uncertain, their relative values were believed to have 
remained relatively unchanged. 
35 Additional features were considered. In particular, to facilitate banks’ needs for target levels of liquidity. 
Charles Plott suggested that bidders be allowed to submit a small number of “conditional package bids,” 
each consisting in a bundle of individual bids (i.e. an amount of a security and a price) accompanied with 
the condition “if one bid in the package is accepted, then all other bids in the package are cancelled.” 
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whether the reference prices are revealed before or after the auction. Six sessions were 
run for each of the four treatments, using undergraduate students.36  The experiments 
were conducted in the Veconlab at the University of Virginia and the CIRANO's Bell 
Laboratory for Experimental Economics in Montreal.37, 38 A session, which lasted about 
an hour and fifteen minutes, involved a group of 6 bidders and 6 securities, labeled A 
through F.  There were 10 units (shares) of each security, and each bidder was endowed 
with 5 units of one security, 3 of a second, and 2 of a third.  The ownership pattern was 
balanced in the sense that, for each security, 5 units were owned by one person (who 
therefore had some market power), 3 units were owned by another, and 2 units were 
owned by a third person.  This ownership concentration was intended to provide more 
opportunities for strategic bidder behavior, and therefore more of a stress test of the 
auction designs.  Given the complex nature of the environment and the relatively 
unfamiliar reverse (low bids win) auction format, we decided to include some context, 
without being too specific.  For example, the items being purchased were referred to as 
“shares” of “securities” instead of “mortgage backed securities,” and the purchaser was 
referred to as the “government” instead of the “Treasury.” This terminology will be used 
in the discussion of experiment results. 
 
There were 8 auctions per session. As explained in the previous section, we consider 
sealed bid, common value, uniform-price auctions with reference prices. Prior to each 
auction, each of the securities was assigned a common value that was randomly drawn 
from a uniform distribution on a range [20, 80]. For each security they owned, bidders 
were given a private, individual-specific “signal” that was independently drawn from a 
uniform distribution centered at the true asset value, with a range of plus or minus 10.  
Since the true values were between 20 and 80, the range of possible signals spanned the 
range from 10 to 90, and bidders were told to think of these numbers as “dollars per 
hundred of par value.” In some of the treatments we also assumed that the government 
received noisy signals about security values as random numbers drawn from a uniform 
distribution with a range of plus or minus 20 from the true security value. In other words, 
the government receives lower quality information than the bidders, at is signals are twice 
                                                 
36 Bidders in the TARP auctions would obviously have been professionals, not students.  Fréchette(2010) 
surveys laboratory studies in which comparable treatments were run with students and professionals.  In 9 
of 13 cases he identified, the results for professionals were neither closer nor farther away from the 
predictions of economic theory in a way that would lead to different conclusions from those obtained with 
students.  In 2 of the remaining 4 studies, the behavior of students was closer to theory.  In one study 
involving a game with randomized strategies, the professionals (male professional soccer players) were 
closer to theory than the students, who were selected from a group who were not majoring in mathematics 
or economics.  The other study that revealed a sharp behavioral difference involved a “threshold public 
goods game” in which professional nurses contributed more to a public good than economics and business 
students (Cadsby and Maynes, 1998).  Fréchette (2010, p. 34) concludes: “overall, much of the big picture 
seems the same whether one looks at professionals or students in laboratory experiments testing economic 
models.”   
37   All auctions were run with the Veconlab Reverse Auction program, which is listed under the Auctions 
menu on http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/admin.php. 
38   In section VII, we also report results of a replication of all 4 treatments (6 sessions each) using an 
alternative earnings frame, and an additional replication of the noisy reference price treatments using 
“absolute” rather than “relative” reference prices.  The treatments with relative reference prices were run at 
the University of Montreal, and the treatments with absolute reference prices presented in section VII were 
run at the University of Virginia.   
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as noisy. Note also that we used matching sets of random draws for each treatment (akin 
to a common random number technique), i.e. each treatment was done with the same 
series of six random number seed values (one per session).  Therefore, all sets of random 
draws (for the security values, the bidders’ value signals and, when relevant, the 
government’s value signals) were the same across treatments for each of the 48 auctions 
in a treatment.  As a result, the experimental outcomes obtained in each treatment may be 
compared directly. 
 
The government purchase budget was set at 2,000 (experiment dollars), corresponding to 
two-thirds of the expected value of the 60 security shares for sale at an auction (3,000). 
This ratio is relatively high compared to what the Treasury was actually considering for 
the TARP auctions (i.e. no more than 50% of the total value of the securities included in 
the auction). This choice tends to help subjects earn money by selling at high prices, and 
at the same time, it provides more of a stress test of the Reference Price auction.  
 
 Bidders could submit “supply functions,” i.e. they could enter a bid price for each of the 
security units they own. At the time subjects submit their bids, the following information 
is common knowledge: i) the distribution of security endowments across bidders, ii) the 
distribution of the randomly determined security values, iii) the conditional distributions 
of the bidders’ signals, and iv) in the relevant treatments, the conditional distributions of 
government signals. For each accepted bid, the bidder would earn the difference between 
the price received from the government and the true value of the security. Otherwise, 
earnings would be zero. We initially adopt this “profit based” procedure as we believe it 
reflects the situation potential TARP bidders faced at the time: The banks owned the 
MBS prior to the auction, and a failure to sell to the government would have left a bank’s 
inventory of assets unchanged. We relax the “profit based” procedure in Section VII, 
where we analyze a robustness check experiment in which the subjects earn a positive 
amount when they keep their assets. It follows that each auction is a zero-sum game, so 
government losses are equal to the bidders’ profits.39  The cash payout rate was 0.05 
(dollars per dollar of experiment earnings), and they were generally in the $13-$30 range, 
with an average of about $23. 
 
The four treatments conducted are summarized in Table 1. Observe that the treatments 
essentially differ in two ways: how the reference prices are calculated and whether or not 
they are announced before the auction. 
  
                                                 
39 Note that this may not have been the case in practice.  Indeed, some have argued that the securities were 
worth less to the bidders than to the government because i) the government may have been a more patient 
investor, or ii) some bidders faced a need for immediate liquidity.  
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Table 1. Treatments and Associated Reference Price Structures 
Treatment Reference Price Estimates 
Reference Price 
Information 
Grand Auction (no reference prices) None  Irrelevant 
Announced Accurate Reference Prices Accurate Announced 
Announced Noisy Reference Prices Noisy Announced 
Secret Noisy Reference Prices Noisy Secret 
 
Treatment 1: Grand Auction.  Bids for all securities are collected, ranked, and the 
government purchases the securities with the lowest price bids (without any regard for 
the types of securities purchased) until its budget is exhausted. The price of the lowest 
rejected bid (i.e. with the lowest price bid among all rejected bids) determines the market 
clearing price. A bidder is paid the market clearing price for each unit of a security 
accepted by the government. This implies that all securities are purchased by the 
government at the same price regardless of type.  Notice that the Grand Auction 
corresponds to a special case of a Reference Price auction in which all reference prices 
are set to 1, and hence are irrelevant.  In this case, reference prices provide no basis for 
adjusting bids to reflect relative security values, so the low bids should come from 
owners of the more “toxic” low-value securities.  Because of the adverse selection 
problem, this simple combined auction was expected to yield low value for a given 
government purchase budget. This treatment may therefore be interpreted as a lower 
benchmark against which the treatments involving reference prices will be compared.  
 
Treatment 2: Announced Accurate Reference Price Auction.  
This treatment is the same as Treatment 1, except that the government first divides bids 
for a security by a reference price announced to bidders before the auction. The reference 
prices in this treatment are perfectly accurate indicators of relative value, even if security 
values are not known by government officials in an absolute sense. More specifically, the 
reference price for a security is equal to the ratio of that security’s value to the value of a 
baseline security.  By construction, this baseline security “A” has a reference price of 1. 
As explained in the previous section, the government purchases the securities with the 
lowest normalized prices. The normalized price of the lowest rejected bid (i.e. with the 
lowest normalized price among all rejected bids) determines the normalized market 
clearing price, which is determined recursively so as to exhaust the auction budget. The 
actual price paid by the government for a security is then determined by multiplying the 
reference price ratio for that security by the common normalized market clearing price.  
 
In this ideal case where relative security values are precisely known by the government, 
the reference prices should create a level playing field by homogenizing the bids for 
securities of different values, and should therefore promote competition across bidders 
and securities. In addition, bidders in this treatment do not have the opportunity to exploit 
the information they possess about the securities they own in order to extract a rent from 
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the government. This scenario is therefore expected to provide an upper bound on 
purchase efficiency, at least for single-round auctions, as measured by actual value 
purchased to the auction budget. 
 
 
Treatment 3: Announced Noisy Reference Price Auction. This treatment is the same as 
Treatment 2, except that the government now relies on noisy reference prices. More 
precisely, the reference prices are determined as ratios of the government noisy signal for 
each security to the government noisy signal for a base security. Note also that this 
treatment may be considered an extreme case of an auction with noisy reference prices 
for at least two reasons. First, the government’s information about the absolute value of 
each security is poor. Indeed, its signals are twice as noisy as the bidders. Second, the 
government’s information about the relative values of the securities is even poorer. 
Indeed, by taking the ratio of its noisy signals the government compounds its errors. As a 
result, the reference prices the government uses to decide which security to purchase may 
be highly inaccurate, or even close to meaningless in some cases. In our experiment, for 
instance, the reference price of one of the securities was incorrectly set at one ninth of its 
actual relative value.  
 
As explained in the previous section, bidders could take advantage of “overpriced” 
reference prices when noisy reference prices are announced before the auction. In 
particular, compared to the previous treatment, a bidder could find it profitable to bid less 
aggressively (i.e. by submitting higher prices). This strategy may permit the bidder to 
increase the market clearing price without compromising the bid’s chances of being 
accepted. Compared to the previous treatment, the opportunity for bidders’ manipulation 
in response to mispriced reference prices may therefore lead the government to overpay 
to acquire the same value.  
 
 
Treatment 4: Secret Noisy Reference Price Auction. This treatment is the same as 
Treatment 3 except that the government does not announce its noisy reference prices 
before the auction. The bidders must therefore form an expectation about the reference 
prices the government will use to score their bids. The reference prices, the allocation 
mechanism and the pricing rules, however, are exactly the same as in Treatment 3. 
Observe that there are actually two differences between these two treatments.  The first is 
strategic, as the bidders in the treatment without announcements do not know the 
reference prices against which their bids will be scored. The second is informational, as 
the bidders who do see announced reference prices are able to observe additional (noisy) 
information about the relative values that can be inferred from government reference 
prices. 
 
By not announcing reference prices before the auction, the government should be 
protected against strategic reactions to overpriced reference prices, and hence, the value 
of securities purchased for a given auction budget should be higher with secret (but 
noisy) reference prices, as compared with announced (but noisy) reference prices. 
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 V.  Laboratory Results 
 
Summary outcome measures are organized by treatment in Table 2.  As is apparent from 
the top row, the government nearly exhausts its $2,000 auction purchase budget in all 
treatments. Note also that the government expenditure is the lowest and the most variable 
in the Grand Auction. The second row in Table 2 gives the average actual values of the 
securities purchased by the government in the auctions. Observe that the government 
operates the auctions at a loss in our experiment since its expenditure exceeds the total 
value of the securities purchased for all four treatments. Since this is a zero-sum game, 
subjects earn positive profits in all treatments. This result is not surprising given the 
relatively high budget we set for the government in order to guarantee our subjects 
positive earnings.  
 
As would be expected, the average value of assets acquired is the lowest with the Grand 
Auction and it is the highest with accurate reference prices, as shown by the first two 
columns in row 2. Next consider the last two columns for the treatments with noisy 
reference prices. As expected, the value purchased by the government when announcing 
the reference prices before the auction is intermediate compared to the two previous 
treatments.  In contrast with our prediction, however, the average value purchased 
appears to be slightly lower when noisy reference prices are kept secret at the time of the 
auction.   
 
Table 2. Average Auction Outcomes by Treatment (with Standard Deviations) 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 
Row  Grand Auction: No Reference Prices 
Accurate Announced 
Reference Prices 
Noisy Announced 
Reference Prices 
Noisy Secret 
Reference Prices 
1 Government Expenditure 
1,912.4 
(103.6) 
 
1,955.0 
(48.0) 
 
1,934.9 
(38.8) 
 
1,943.2 
(52.8) 
 
2 Value of Assets Purchased 
1,465.1 
(207.1) 
1,830.2 
(177.5) 
1,694.2 
(208.5) 
 
1,659.5 
(142.6) 
 
3 Purchase Efficiency† 
0.766 
(0.106) 
0.936 
(0.087) 
0.876 
(0.102) 
 
0.854 
(0.068) 
 
† Purchase efficiency is defined as the ratio of the value purchased to the government expenditure. 
 
These treatment differences may be better appreciated when considering our measure of 
purchase efficiency, i.e. the ratio of the value of assets purchased to government 
expenditure in row 3.  The Grand Auction produced an efficiency ratio of 0.766, meaning 
that for every dollar spent, the government purchases only 76.6 cents in value. In contrast, 
despite the relatively high purchase budget, the accurate announced Reference Prices 
Auction is almost fully efficient, with an efficiency percentage of nearly 94%.  In other 
words, if the government can acquire precise estimates of the securities relative values, 
then, as hypothesized, a Reference Price auction would homogenize the different 
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securities and produce a nearly efficient outcome. The outcomes of the Grand Auction 
and of the accurate announced Reference Price auction are therefore consistent with our 
predictions as the two treatments constitute two opposite benchmarks.  
 
The two treatments with noisy reference prices produce intermediate purchase efficiency 
ratios. This implies that, because of its homogenizing properties, a Reference Price 
auction is superior to the Grand Auction even when the government has little information 
about the relative values of the securities. Observe, however, that keeping the noisy 
reference prices secret at the time of the auction does not improve the auction efficiency, 
in contrast with our prediction.  Below, we show that this result is not due to the fact that 
the auction with secret noisy reference prices underperformed. Instead, we find evidence 
that the auction with announced noisy reference prices performed beyond expectation 
because it created competitive incentives that offset incentives to exploit mispriced 
reference prices. To sum up, the Reference Price auctions clearly dominate the Grand 
Auction, even when reference prices are extremely noisy, but keeping reference prices 
secret before the auction does not reduce the government losses. 
 
Figure 1 shows that treatment differences in terms of purchase efficiency also hold up on 
an auction-by-auction basis when averaged over the 6 sessions.  (Please ignore the 
“counterfactual” line, which will be explained below.)  As expected, the Grand Auction 
with no reference prices is the least efficient, while the treatment with accurate 
announced reference prices is systematically the most efficient. The two treatments with 
noisy reference prices produce intermediate and somewhat similar efficiency ratios. 
Another interesting feature of the figure is that the purchase efficiency measures are 
fairly flat, thereby showing no evidence of learning or strategic adjustments, except for a 
possible decline in performance across auctions in the Grand Auction, which will be 
evaluated in more detail below. In other words, the dominance of the Reference Price 
auction in terms of efficiency is immediate, and does not require the bidders to 
familiarize themselves to the slightly more complicated auction design.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Purchase Efficiency (Value to Expenditure Ratio)  
by Auction (averaged over the 6 sessions) 
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The auction outcomes in the two noisy reference price treatments, and in particular the 
drop in efficiency compared to the benchmark auction with accurate reference prices,  
may be the result of both i) noise in the reference prices, and ii)  strategic adjustments in 
the bidders’ behavior to this noise. In an effort to disentangle these two effects we 
conduct a counterfactual exercise in which we take the observed bids that were submitted 
with noisy secret reference prices and score them against accurate (instead of noisy) 
reference prices. The basic assumption underlying this counterfactual exercise is that 
subjects in the noisy unobserved reference price treatment would have behaved in the 
same way had the unobserved reference prices been accurate instead of noisy. As 
indicated in Figure 1, the counterfactual exercise produces significantly higher purchase 
efficiency measures in each auction than for the two noisy reference price treatments, and 
statistically indistinguishable from those observed when reference prices were accurate 
and announced (Treatment 2). This result suggests that the lower purchase efficiency 
ratios obtained in the two noisy reference price treatments should be essentially attributed 
to noisy reference prices, not to adjustment of bidding behavior on the part of the subjects 
in the face of greater uncertainty about reference prices. 
 
Since subjects in one session did not participate in another, we consider inferences based 
on averages over the 8 auctions conducted for the 6 independent sessions in each 
treatment, which are shown in Table 3.  As previously explained, each treatment 
consisted of a session for each of the 6 random number “seed” values, so as to use 
parallel sets of random values and “signal” draws for each treatment.  The session 
averages, arranged by seed, are shown in the second column of Table 3.  For all 6 seed 
values, the average purchase efficiency ratios are lowest for the treatment with no 
reference prices (top row), and are highest for the treatment with accurate announced 
reference prices (bottom row).  These differences are significant at conventional levels, 
using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, as shown in the far right column of the table.  Here, the 
Z and p values pertain to two-tailed tests between averages for a given treatment and 
averages for the treatment in the row just above it.  Note, however, that for 5 out of 6 
seeds, the average efficiency ratios are higher with noisy announced reference prices than 
for noisy secret reference prices, although the result is not significant (p = .24 for a 2-
tailed test).     
 
Table 3. Purchase Efficiency by Session: Value/Expenditure Ratios 
Averaged over all 8 Auctions per Session 
 
Treatment: 
Reference Prices 
Session Purchase Efficiency 
Averages for Seeds 1 to 6 
Treatment 
Average 
Wilcoxon  
Signed-Rank Test* 
None (unitary) .79, .81, .79, .77, .72, .74 .766   
Announced, Noisy .85, .86, .89, .92, .90, .83  .876 Z = –2.201 P value = 0.028 
Secret, Noisy .84, .84, .87, .83, .87, .87  .854 Z = 1.166 P value = 0.244 
Announced, Accurate .91, .91, .97, .89, .99, .95 .936 Z = –2.207 P value = 0.027 
* Each test compares the distribution of the 6 ratios in the corresponding row with the distribution in the row above. 
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When purchase efficiency is measured in terms of the ratio of value purchased to 
government expenditure, the main results of this section can be summarized: 
 
Purchase Efficiency Results:  In an experiment with uniform-price reverse auctions for 
heterogeneous securities, purchase efficiency is lowest when reference prices are not 
used (the Grand Auction) and it is close to full value when reference prices are accurate 
measures of relative security values.  Intermediate efficiency measures are observed 
when the government only possesses noisy reference prices, but these efficiency measures 
are not improved by keeping reference prices secret to avoid strategic manipulation of 
bids for mispriced securities. The counterfactual exercise suggests that the lower 
efficiencies in the treatments with noisy reference prices are mostly due to the highly 
inaccurate reference prices, rather than to bidder responses to noisy reference prices.    
 
Next, we consider the issue of price discovery, i.e. the extent to which the auction 
clearing prices for each security provide accurate information about their unobserved 
values. As shown in Figure 2, the median clearing prices are slightly above the 
underlying values for all four treatments.  This difference may be considered relatively 
small given that the government purchase budget was relatively high, at two-thirds of the 
expected values of all securities combined.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Security Sale Price at Auction vs. Security Actual Value 
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Note that, as expected, prices resulting from the Grand Auction are widely dispersed and 
essentially uninformative.  In contrast, when reference prices are accurate (Treatment 2 
and the counterfactual), the auction clearing prices are tightly distributed.  There are no 
obvious differences between the two treatments with noisy reference prices; they are both 
slightly better than the Grand Auction in terms of price discovery, but worse than the 
treatment and counterfactual exercise with accurate reference prices.  In other words, the 
extent to which security values are not accurately revealed in Treatment 4 (and by 
extension in Treatment 3) is due in large part to the fact that reference prices are 
measured with noise, not to bidders’ behavior in these environments.  These observations 
can be summarized: 
 
Price Discovery Results: Median auction clearing prices tend to exceed the underlying 
security values in all treatments, with the greatest dispersion in the Grand Auction (no 
reference prices) and the least dispersion in the treatment and counterfactual exercise 
with accurate reference prices. 
 
The analysis of individual bidding patterns in the next section provides an explanation for 
the somewhat surprising result that purchase efficiencies and price discovery measures do 
not improve when secret (noisy) reference prices are kept secret.    
 
 
IV. Econometric Analysis 
The analysis in this section is based on behavioral patterns that emerge from a series of 
reduced-form panel regressions of the form: 
 
௜ܻ,௧,௦,௞ୀߙ ௜ܺ,௧,௦,௞ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ௜ܷ,௧,௦,௞ , 
 
where the subscript i = 1,..,36 indexes subjects in a specific treatment (6 sessions with 6 
bidders each), t = 1,…,8 characterizes the auction number, s = 1,…,6 a security for sale at 
an auction, and k = 1,…,5 captures the order (from lowest to highest) of the bids 
submitted by a bidder for a unit of given security. So, k = 1 corresponds to the lowest bid 
submitted by a subject for a unit of a given security. Finally, ߤ௜ is an individual random 
effect ሺܸܽݎሺߤ௜ሻ ൌ ߪ௜ଶሻ, and ߤ௧ is an auction random effect ሺܸܽݎሺߤ௧ሻ ൌ ߪ௧ଶሻ.40 
 
Bidding Behavior 
 
Table 4 shows the estimates for the reduced-form bid functions, where the dependent 
variable is the price bid by a subject to sell a unit of a given security. In all treatments, we 
find that, all else equal, subjects tend to submit higher bids when they receive a high 
signal (row 1) and for the last bids they submit for a given security (row 4). These results 
were expected. In particular, the second result simply reflects the fact that a subject’s bids 
for a given security are ranked in ascending order.  
  
                                                 
40 The results presented below are virtually identical when we include a session fixed effect. 
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Table 4. Panel Data Model where the Endogenous Variable is the Price Bid 
 
 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Grand Auction 
(No Reference 
Prices) 
Accurate 
Announced 
Reference 
Prices 
Noisy 
Announced  
Reference 
Prices 
Noisy 
Secret 
Reference 
Prices 
1 Signal 0.901
*** 
(0.016) 
0.783*** 
(0.025) 
0.709*** 
(0.023) 
0.863*** 
(0.027) 
2 Auction # 0.299
*** 
(0.071) 
0.447*** 
(0.121) 
0.073 
(0.154) 
-0.227*** 
(0.074) 
3 # of Contracts Owned 
-0.441* 
(0.240) 
-0.218 
(0.421) 
-0.775 
(0.524) 
-0.326 
(0.247) 
4 Bid # 3.452
*** 
(0.542) 
5.443*** 
(0.940) 
5.568*** 
(1.136) 
6.059*** 
(0.550) 
5 (Bid #) * (# of Contracts Owned) 
-0.309** 
(0.118) 
-0.545** 
(0.202) 
-0.580** 
(0.240) 
-0.665*** 
(0.124) 
6 Reference Price __ 6.647
*** 
(0.454) 
2.631*** 
(0.463) 
-0.157 
(0.216) 
7 “Overpriced” Reference Price† __ __ 
1.534* 
(0.885) 
0.790 
(0.608) 
8 “Underpriced” Reference Price† __ __ 
-5.894*** 
(1.785) 
-0.162 
(0.834) 
9 Constant -1.814 (1.455) 
-6.847** 
(2.421) 
3.676 
(3.079) 
1.200 
(1.597) 
10 Sigma u 5.548
*** 
(0.550) 
6.961*** 
(0.857) 
7.897*** 
(1.333) 
6.263*** 
(0.747) 
11 Sigma i 7.543
*** 
(0.093) 
7.642*** 
(0.163) 
10.103*** 
(0.197) 
6.892*** 
(0.098) 
12 Sigma t 4.125
*** 
(0.103) 
4.326*** 
(0.185) 
5.921*** 
(0.187) 
4.568*** 
(0.140) 
13 N 2796 2876 2857 2872 
14 Log Likelihood -9283.1 -11216.7 -11674.1 -9690.3 
† For security S, Overpriced (Underpriced) is set equal to |A|*IA>0 ( |A|*IA<0), where A=Reference PriceS – ValueS / ValueA. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at respectively the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the subject level. 
 
We also identify different forms of learning across treatments. All else equal, subjects in 
the Grand Auction tend to bid less aggressively against other bidders (i.e. submit higher 
bids) from one auction to the next (row 2 of Table 4). Likewise subjects in Treatment 2 
(Accurate Announced Reference Prices) learn to increase their bids. Further analysis 
reveals that subjects in Treatment 2 learn to submit higher bids for high-value securities 
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(or equivalently, for securities with high reference prices). In contrast, subjects in 
Treatment 4 (Secret Noisy Reference Prices) lower their bids over time. They seem to 
learn that they must become more aggressive in order for their bids to be accepted. 
 
In all treatments, subjects tend to send lower bids when they have some market power for 
that security (i.e. when they own more contracts of that security), although the effect is in 
general insignificant (row 3 of Table 4). Crossing the bid number and the number of 
contracts owned, yields negative and significant estimates, thereby indicating that bidders 
who own more contracts of a given security raise their prices from one unit of that 
security to the next at a slower pace (row 5 of Table 4). 
 
Finally, we can evaluate the specific influence (i.e. controlling for the bidder’s signal) of 
reference prices on bidding for the three treatments with reference prices (row 6 of Table 
4). When the reference prices are kept secret at the time of the auction (Treatment 4), we 
find no relationship between the bids submitted and the reference prices, as would be 
expected. In contrast, reference prices do have an effect when they are announced before 
the auction; bids are positively correlated with announced reference prices, as expected.   
 
We are also in a position to evaluate how subjects adjust their bids in response to the 
errors the government makes when setting reference prices. To do so, we first define the 
mispricing as the absolute deviation between the government’s (noisy) reference price 
ratio and the true ratio of values (i.e. the ratio of the security’s true value divided by the 
true value of security A). The variable “Overpriced Reference Price” (respectively 
“Underpriced Reference Price”) is then set equal to this absolute deviation when the 
difference between the government’s reference price ratio and the true ratio of values is 
positive (negative), and zero otherwise. As expected, neither form of mispricing 
influences bids in Treatment 4 with secret reference prices, since the bidders are unable 
to observe the bias in advance. In that respect, keeping the reference prices secret does 
indeed provide the government some protection against incorrect reference prices. When 
noisy reference prices are announced (Treatment 3), however, we can see that, as 
expected, bidders take advantage of overpriced reference prices by submitting slightly 
higher bids (row 7). The effect however is only significant at the 5% level, and its 
magnitude is not significantly greater than in the noisy secret reference price treatment. 
Interestingly, our results also suggest that subjects bid substantially more aggressively 
(i.e. submit lower bids) when the reference price is underpriced (row 8). In other words, it 
appears that bidders who own a security that has been underpriced tend to realize that 
they are at a disadvantage, and they may try to compensate by lowering their bids in 
order to remain competitive. Observing such behavior was somewhat surprising to us, as 
it not only reflects strategic sophistication on the part of our subjects, but also it was not 
anticipated when the Treasury team discussed the merits and potential drawbacks of the 
Reference Price auction. This also demonstrates how useful lab experiment can be at 
testing the impact of public policies to be implemented in complex environments. To 
summarize:  
 
Bidding Responses to Noisy Reference Prices:  Bids are responsive to announced 
reference prices. Bidders also respond to perceived biases in government pre-announced 
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reference prices. Namely, subjects increase their bids slightly when the reference prices 
are overpriced, and lower their bids substantially when the reference prices are 
underpriced. These two effects partially offset each other, which essentially explains why 
keeping the reference prices secret does not improve the auction purchase efficiency. In 
other words, one could say that the absence of significant difference between the last two 
treatments reflects the fact that the noisy announced reference price treatment performed 
above expectations, not that the noisy secret reference price treatment performed below 
expectations.  
  
 Purchase Probabilities 
 
Next we turn to selection issues, i.e. which securities tend to be purchased in the auctions. 
For the probit panel regressions in Table 5, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a bid 
for a unit of a security is accepted, and 0 otherwise.   For each treatment, a bid is more 
likely to be accepted i) when the bidder under-evaluated the security, i.e. the private 
value signal was below the actual security value (row 2), ii) when the bidder owns more 
units of a security (row 4), and iii) for the first bids submitted for a given security, as 
these correspond (by construction) to lower bids for a security (row 5). These results are 
consistent with intuition.  
 
Likewise, as expected, lower value securities are significantly more likely to be 
purchased in the Grand Auction (row 1 of Table 5). Although, the magnitude is 
substantially lower, the same significant effect is found with secret noisy reference prices 
(Treatment 4). In contrast, the value of a security has no bearing on its probability of 
being purchased by the government for the treatments (2 and 3) in which reference prices 
are announced in advance. In other words, the use of reference prices appears to be 
effective in homogenizing securities of different values, but it is not fully effective when 
reference prices are only announced ex post. 
 
In all treatments with reference prices (treatments 2, 3 and 4), the probability of a security 
being purchased is (all else equal) unrelated to its reference price (row 6). In both 
treatments with noisy reference prices, however, a bid is more likely to be accepted when 
a reference price is overpriced (row 7) and less likely to be accepted when it is 
underpriced (row 8). When the reference prices are kept secret (Treatment 4), this result 
only reflects the mechanics of the allocation process. Indeed, since behavior is the same 
regardless of the reference pricing errors, bids are automatically more likely to be 
accepted when a reference price is overpriced. When noisy reference prices are 
announced in advance, we saw from the estimated bid functions in Table 4 that bidders 
do indeed adjust their bids in reaction to biases in reference prices. The results obtained 
in Table 5 for Treatment 3 therefore reflect both a mechanical and a strategic effect. 
Observe in particular, that the magnitude of the effects of the two forms of mispricing is 
significantly lower when reference prices are announced in advance (Treatment 3) 
instead of being kept secret (Treatment 4).41 Perhaps surprisingly, having noisy reference 
                                                 
41  In fact, all else equal, incorrectly setting a security’s reference price at 1.5 instead of 1 increases the 
security’s chances of being purchased in the noisy announced reference price treatment by 9%. Conversely, 
incorrectly setting a security’s reference price at 0.5 instead of 1 decreases the security’s chances of being 
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prices has a greater influence on which securities are purchased when reference prices are 
secret. 
 
Table 5. Panel Probit Model where the Endogenous Variable Equals 1 if Bid Is Accepted 
 
 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Grand Auction 
Unitary 
Reference 
Prices 
Accurate 
Announced 
Reference 
Prices 
Noisy 
Announced 
Reference 
Prices 
Noisy  
Secret 
Reference 
Prices 
1 Security Value -0.089
*** 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.010*** 
(0.004) 
2 Signal Bias (i.e. Signal – Value) 
-0.082*** 
(0.014) 
-0.104*** 
(0.010) 
-0.058*** 
(0.006) 
-0.066*** 
(0.010) 
3 Auction # 0.005 (0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.019) 
-0.024 
(0.015) 
0.031 
(0.016) 
4 # of Contracts Owned 
0.242*** 
(0.055) 
0.138*** 
(0.039) 
0.137*** 
(0.037) 
0.158*** 
(0.031) 
5 Bid # -0.312
*** 
(0.035) 
-0.266*** 
(0.042) 
-0.194*** 
(0.021) 
-0.298*** 
(0.029) 
6 Reference Price __ -0.013 (0.134) 
-0.019 
(0.021) 
0.086 
(0.107) 
7 “Overpriced” Reference Price† __ __ 
0.426* 
(0.204) 
1.235*** 
(0.212) 
8 “Underpriced” Reference Price† __ __ 
-2.039*** 
(0.273) 
-3.016*** 
(0.258) 
9 Constant 0.536
*** 
(0.071) 
0.684** 
(0.277) 
0.515 
(0.171) 
0.606* 
(0.212) 
10 Sigma u 0.581
*** 
(0.087) 
0.569*** 
(0.071) 
0.523*** 
(0.080) 
0.436*** 
(0.057) 
11 Sigma i 0.417
*** 
(0.055) 
0.512*** 
(0.050) 
0.486*** 
(0.057) 
0.461*** 
(0.039) 
12 Sigma t 0.241
*** 
(0.052) 
0.193*** 
(0.032) 
0.197*** 
(0.042) 
0.275*** 
(0.049) 
13 N 2880 2880 2880 2880 
14 Log Likelihood -881.2 -1492.3 -1562.1 -1401.2 
† For security S, Overpriced (Underpriced) is set equal to |A|*IA>0 ( |A|*IA<0), where A=Reference PriceS – ValueS / ValueA. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at respectively the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the subject level. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
purchased in the noisy announced reference price treatment by 32%.  When reference prices are not 
announced, the analogous increase and decrease percentages are much larger, at 26% and 51%.    
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Purchase Probability Results: 
In the Grand Auction the government tends to purchase securities of low value. When 
reference prices are announced, the purchase probabilities are largely uncorrelated with 
security values. When reference prices are noisy, announcing them before the auction 
helps soften (and not increase as hypothesized) the impact of mispricing on the values of 
securities that are purchased.  
 
 
Government Losses 
 
Finally, we consider the factors that affect the difference between the amount paid by the 
government and the values of securities purchased.  Recall that the experimental setup is 
such that government losses correspond to bidders’ profits, and vice versa.  The 
dependent variable for the panel regressions in Table 6 is the government losses on each 
accepted bid, that is, the difference between the auction price and the security actual 
value.  It is apparent from the reported estimates that, in all treatments, the government 
loses more money i) on low-value securities (row 1), ii) when the bidder overestimates 
the security’s value (row 2), and iii) on the last bids submitted by a bidder for a given 
security (row 5). Observe in particular that, as expected, the extent of the first effect is 
significantly larger in the Grand Auction, without reference prices, where bidders are 
more likely to sell low-value securities. Note also that government losses in the Grand 
Auction tend to increase from one auction to the next. This result is a direct consequence 
of the increase in the submitted bids observed previously in Table 4. 
 
Finally, consider the effects of using reference prices.  When reference prices are 
announced (treatments 2 and 3), we find that all else equal, the government losses 
increase with the reference price (row 6), holding constant other factors such as the value 
of the security. This observation reflects the fact that subjects tend to bid higher in this 
situation.  Finally, as one would expect, the government loses more when reference prices 
are overpriced (row 7) and less when reference prices are underpriced (row 8). Note that, 
although the magnitudes of both of these effects are larger in Treatment 3 when noisy 
announced reference prices are announced rather than kept secret, the difference between 
the treatments is once again not significant. To sum up:   
 
Government Loss Results:  In the Grand Auction, the government loses money on low 
value securities it purchases. This is much less the case in all three Reference Price 
auctions. The impact of incorrectly set reference prices on the government losses is not 
significantly affected by whether or not these noisy reference prices are announced or 
kept secret before the auction. 
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Table 6. Panel Data Model where the Endogenous Variable is the Government Losses  
for each Security Purchased (i.e. Price - Value)  
 
 
 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Grand Auction 
Unitary 
Reference 
Prices 
Accurate 
Announced 
Reference 
Prices 
Noisy 
Announced 
Reference 
Prices 
Noisy  
Secret 
Reference 
Prices 
1 Security Value -0.872
*** 
(0.016) 
-0.118*** 
(0.014) 
-0.185*** 
(0.033) 
-0.152*** 
(0.027) 
2 Signal Bias (i.e. Signal – Value) 
0.081** 
(0.032) 
0.122*** 
(0.034) 
0.224*** 
(0.069) 
0.245*** 
(0.059) 
3 Auction # 0.239
** 
(0.111) 
-0.196* 
(0.128) 
-0.327 
(0.295) 
-0.140 
(0.182) 
4 # of Contracts Owned 
-0.120 
(0.094) 
-0.160** 
(0.069) 
-0.004 
(0.214) 
-0.414 
(0.265) 
5 Bid # 0.124
** 
(0.037) 
0.061 
(0.048) 
0.199** 
(0.085) 
0.731* 
(0.133) 
6 Reference Price __ 6.672
*** 
(0.450) 
4.235*** 
(0.785) 
0.599 
(0.612) 
7 “Overpriced” Reference Price† __ __ 
4.710*** 
(1.560) 
2.130*** 
(1.468) 
8 “Underpriced” Reference Price† __ __ 
-32.351*** 
(3.677) 
-29.102*** 
(3.122) 
9 Constant 35.546
*** 
(1.430) 
0.750 
(1.032) 
7.703*** 
(1.575) 
10.735*** 
(1.638) 
10 Sigma u 2.371
*** 
(0.112) 
0.966*** 
(0.141) 
3.291*** 
(0.207) 
1.947*** 
(0.284) 
11 Sigma i 2.427
*** 
(0.156) 
2.332*** 
(0.205) 
6.847*** 
(0.351) 
6.959*** 
(0.364) 
12 Sigma t 1.854
*** 
(0.216) 
1.629*** 
(0.174) 
2.009*** 
(0.216) 
1.998*** 
(0.235) 
13 N 1745 1799 1666 1655 
14 Log Likelihood -4768.1 -4656.2 -5712.7 -5592.0 
† For security S, Overpriced (Underpriced) is set equal to |A|*IA>0 ( |A|*IA<0), where A=Reference PriceS – ValueS / ValueA. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at respectively the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the subject level. 
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VII. Additional Robustness Checks 
 
We conducted two additional sets of experiments to assess the robustness of our results. 
The general objective is to verify that the ranking of the four auction formats in terms of 
efficiency ratios does not change when we modify some features of the design. 
 
The first robustness check experiment is concerned with the fact that, in the baseline 
design presented in Section IV, subjects earn nothing when their bids are not accepted. 
Although, this feature is common to a number of auction experiments (see e.g. Kagel and 
Levin 2008) and may be rationalized in the context of the TARP auctions (the banks 
owned the toxic assets prior to the auctions and would not modify their books unless they 
sell to the government), it may also affect behavior. In particular, paying nothing on 
shares not sold may provide subjects with an incentive to bid aggressively in order to 
improve their chances of selling their shares to the government and thereby earn money. 
On the other hand, because of loss aversion, it may lead subjects to bid conservatively in 
order to avoid losses. In other words, paying nothing for the shares not sold at the auction 
could affect behavior, although the direction of the effect is difficult to predict. 
 
To evaluate the possible effect of the earnings frame we modify the payment function in 
the baseline design. For each bid accepted, the bidder now receives the price produced by 
the auction. Otherwise, the bidder earns the true value of the asset. Whether or not a bid 
is accepted, earnings are normalized by subtracting (Signali,s – 10), where Signali,s is the 
signal received by subject i about the true value of security s. To summarize, for each 
share of security s sold to the government bidder i earns Ps – (Signali,s – 10) where Ps is 
the price of security s at the auction, and for each share of security s not sold at the 
auction bidder i earns Vs –(Signali,s – 10) where Vs is the true value of security s revealed 
after the auction. Observe that the normalizing factor (Signali,s – 10) is the lower bond of 
the support of the true value conditional on the subject’s signal. As a result, a bidder is 
guaranteed to earn between $0 and $20 per rejected bid, and losses are not possible unless 
the bid is below the lower bond (Signali,s – 10). Note also that the normalization process 
is such that a bidder’s expected revenue is ex ante the same for a high value and for a low 
value asset. Finally, note that the other features of the design, including the random draws 
for the signals and the security values, are identical to the baseline experiment. Therefore, 
the results can be compared directly across the two sets of experiments. 
The outcomes of the first robustness check experiment for the four treatments (with 6 
sessions each) are summarized in Figure 3 and Table 7. Although not statistically 
significant at the 5% level, two differences with the baseline experiment seem to emerge. 
First, the average efficiency (value to expenditure ratio) is slightly higher in each 
treatment of the robustness check experiment (compare the 3rd column in Tables 3 and 7). 
This therefore suggests that providing subjects with a positive payoff when they do not 
sell a share leads them to bid more aggressively (lower), possibly because the risk of 
losing money has been essentially removed. Second, as indicated in Figure 3, there 
appears to be some learning as the purchase efficiency ratios decline over the first three 
auctions.  
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Despite these slight differences, the robustness check experiment confirms the general 
conclusions reported in section V: i) with an average efficiency ratio of 0.975, the 
Reference Price auction is almost perfectly efficient when the government possesses 
accurate information, ii) the two noisy reference price treatments produce lower 
efficiencies and cannot be distinguished statistically, and iii) the Grand Auction is 
systematically less efficient than the Reference Price auctions, even when the government 
has very noisy information about the value of the securities.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Alternative Earnings Robustness Check: 
Purchase Efficiency (Value to Expenditure Ratio) by Auction  
(averaged over the 6 sessions) 
 
 
Table 7. Alternative Earnings Robustness Check: 
Purchase Efficiency Ratios per Session Averaged over all 8 Auctions per Session 
 
Treatment: 
Reference Prices 
Session Purchase Efficiency 
Averages for Seeds 1 to 6 
Treatment 
Average 
Wilcoxon  
Signed-Rank Test* 
None (unitary) .79, .76, .82, .80, .83, .91 .819   
Announced, Accurate .88, 1.00, 1.03, .95, 1.02, .96 .975 Z = –1.794 P value = 0.047 
Announced, Noisy .82, .88, .90, .94, .97, .83  .890 Z = –2.201 P value = 0.028 
Secret, Noisy .99, .85, .87, .83, .90, .85  .899 Z = 0.000 P value = 1.000 
* Each test compares the distribution of the 6 ratios in the corresponding row with the distribution in the row above. 
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The second robustness check experiment we conducted is concerned with the asymmetry 
in the baseline design between the information available to bidders through their signals 
and the information provided by the government through the reference prices. Indeed, a 
subject receives a signal about the absolute value of a security, while, when revealed 
before the auction, the reference price provides information about the relative value of the 
security. This asymmetry in information may be difficult to process, which could explain 
why in the baseline experiment subjects are not able to better exploit the errors made by 
the government when it announces noisy reference prices. 
 
To test this hypothesis we modify the way reference prices are calculated by having the 
government estimate the absolute (rather than relative) value of the corresponding 
security.  In other words, the government sets the reference price of a security equal to 
the signal it receives about the true value of this security. Recall that in the two noisy 
reference price treatments, the government’s signals can take any integer value in a range 
from $20.00 below the true value to $20.00 above the true value, and is therefore twice as 
noisy as the bidders’ signals. Although the reference prices are different than in the 
baseline experiment, the allocation and payment mechanisms remain identical in the 
second robustness check experiment. In particular, submitted bids are still divided by the 
corresponding reference price, and the lowest normalized bids are still accepted first. 
Finally, observe that compared to the baseline experiment, the reference prices are not 
only easier to process for the subjects, but also, they can be much more informative. In 
some cases for instance, they can even reveal the true value of a security to a bidder (e.g. 
a bidder receiving a signal of $30 and observing a reference price of $60 should infer that 
the true value of the security is $40). 
 
We only conducted the two noisy reference price treatments (6 sessions each) for the 
second robustness check experiment. Indeed, the Grand Auction is not affected by the 
change in reference prices, and running the accurate reference price treatment would 
mean revealing the true value of the assets to the bidders. The results reported in Table 8 
and Figure 4 confirm once again that the Reference Price auction performs better than the 
Grand auction even when the government has imprecise estimates of the reference prices. 
In addition, as indicated in Figure 3, the noisy reference price treatment produces slightly 
higher average efficiency ratio (0.894 versus 0.847) when the reference prices are 
announced instead of kept secret. As indicated in the last column of Table 8, however, the 
difference between the two treatments is not significant at the 10% significance level. In 
other words, consistent with the results reported in Section V, subjects are not able to 
exploit the government mistakes, even when the announced reference prices are 
expressed in terms of absolute rather than relative values. 
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Figure 4.  Absolute Reference Price Robustness Check: 
Purchase Efficiency (Value to Expenditure Ratio) 
Averaged Over All 6 sessions 
 
 
 
Table 8.  
Alternative Earnings Robustness Check: Purchase Efficiency Ratios per Session 
Averaged over all 8 Auctions per Session 
Treatment: 
Reference Prices 
Session Purchase Efficiency 
Averages for Seeds 1 to6 
Treatment 
Average 
Wilcoxon  
Signed-Rank Test* 
None (unitary) .79, .81, .79, .77, .72, .74 .766   
Announced, Noisy .89, .93, .87, .88, .99, .82  .894 Z = –2.201 P value = 0.028 
Secret, Noisy .81, .82, .91, .82, .89, .84  .847 Z = -1.572 P value = 0.116 
* Each test compares the distribution of the 6 ratios in the corresponding row with the distribution in the row above. 
 
 
VIII. Summary and Lessons for Structuring Future Auctions 
 
The laboratory results indicate that running a combined auction for diverse and 
imprecisely valued securities, using “reference price” to normalize bids, would promote 
competition while providing some protection against adverse selection.  As expected, in 
the Grand Auction without reference prices, the government purchases the lowest quality 
securities and overpays. The purchase efficiency level (i.e. the ratio of value purchased 
by the government divided by its expenditure) in that case is only 77%.  In contrast, when 
reference prices are perfect indicators of security values, the Reference Price auction 
works well in the sense that it enables the government to purchase securities almost at 
full value, with purchase efficiency of 94%.  In a treatment where reference prices are 
noisy and pre-announced, efficiency drops to 88%. This result, however, may be 
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Efficiency
Auction
Noisy Announced
Noisy Secret
Grand Auction
 30
considered remarkable as the government receives extremely noisy signals about the 
value of the assets in this treatment, and therefore sets nearly uninformative reference 
prices.  Moreover, the pre-announcement of noisy reference prices does not reduce 
government purchase efficiency as compared with the case when these reference prices 
are kept secret. The absence of a substantial effect of announcing noisy reference prices 
may be explained by the combination of two factors that essentially offset each other. 
First, when announced reference prices are overpriced, subjects bid higher (less 
aggressively) leading to higher auction clearing prices. But when reference prices are 
underpriced, subjects bid lower (more aggressively) to stay competitive, leading to lower 
auction clearing prices.  To sum up, the basic Reference Price auction the Treasury had 
chosen to purchase illiquid mortgage backed securities performed well in our experiment, 
even when the reference prices are set with a substantial amount of noise. 
 
The results presented in this paper therefore illustrate how experimental economics may 
be a useful complement to economic theory and economic intuition when designing 
public policy in complex environments or under considerable time pressure. In particular, 
although the economists and auction designers involved in the project correctly predicted 
the negative impact of announced overpriced reference prices, they did not anticipate the 
counterbalancing effect generated by owners of securities with underpriced reference 
prices. In other words, the experiment revealed that a design with noisy announced 
reference prices would perform better than expected. 
 
More generally, our results provide some support to the auction designers (e.g. 
Klemperer, 2002) who have argued that beyond optimality considerations, the 
performance of an auction is mostly driven in practice by basic economics forces. In this 
case, the relative success of the Reference Price auction may be explained in large part by 
the fact that it promotes competition. Indeed, the design lets owners of different securities 
bid against each other on a relatively leveled playing field. 
 
Finally, observe that the lessons learned in this paper are applicable beyond the 
Treasury’s Toxic Assets auction. Indeed, there are many examples of auctions in which 
several items with heterogeneous characteristics are sold simultaneously. This is the case 
in particular in the financial world when the various assets of a failing institutions are 
liquidated. Likewise, Open Market Operations, the most common channel through which 
monetary policy is implemented in the U.S. and around the world, typically consist of 
nearly daily multi-billion auctions in which a central bank must decide which of different 
securities to accept.  
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Appendix A. Instructions 
Instructions, Page 1 of 6 
 Securities: This is an auction in which you have the role of a bank with a 
portfolio of mortgage-backed assets, referred to as "securities." Owning different 
securities is like owning different stocks. Just as shares of stock in a given 
company are identical, units of a specific security are identical. These units will 
be referred to as "contracts." 
 Security Values: There are 6 different securities, labeled A ... F. Each security 
has an underlying value that is the same for all bidders, but no bidder knows prior 
to the auction what this common value will turn out to be. You have the 
opportunity to sell some of your contracts to the government, but you will incur a 
loss if you sell contracts at prices that are below their values, which will be 
revealed after the auction. 
 Value Estimates: For each security you own, you will receive a signal that is an 
imperfect estimate of the value of that security. Different bidders receive different 
signals about the value of the same security. Some bidders' signals may be above 
that security's true value, and some may be below. The average of all possible 
signal draws is equal to the underlying common value of the security (details to 
follow). 
 Purchase Budget for Combined Auction: The government has budgeted a fixed 
amount, $2000, to purchase contracts for the 6 securities to be included in the 
auction. This budget will typically limit the number of contracts that can be 
purchased. 
 Reverse Auction: This a "reverse auction" in which the government prefers to 
purchase from low bidders. You will be given the chance to submit an offer to sell 
your contracts for each of the different securities that you own. You will be 
bidding against 5 other bidders in each auction. 
 
Instructions, Page 2 of 6 
 Reference Prices: Since securities are different assets, some are intrinsically 
more valuable than others. Many of these securities are not actively traded, and 
the government has hired financial experts to estimate their values. Prior to the 
auction, each security has been assigned an official "reference price" that will be 
used to compare bids for different securities. The reference price is an estimate of 
the value of the security relative to the first security (A). For instance, if the 
reference price for security B is 2, then it means that the government believes that 
security B is twice as valuable as security A. And securities with reference prices 
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below 1 are deemed to be less valuable then A. By construction, the reference 
price for security A is 1. 
 Comparisons: The government is not necessarily interested in purchasing the 
securities with the lowest bid prices. Instead, the government is willing to pay 
more for securities that it believes to be more valuable. To compare bids across 
different securities, each bid submitted will be transformed into a normalized bid 
by dividing it by the reference price for that security. 
 Example: For example, suppose that the reference price for a security is 2. Then a 
bid of $24 on this valuable security is the same as a bid of $12 on security A 
(which always has a reference price of 1), since both bids result in the same 
normalized price: $24/2 = $12/1 = $12. 
 Purchase Decision: The government will accept bids with low normalized bid 
prices, moving to bids with higher and higher normalized bid prices until the fixed 
budget is exhausted or until all bids are accepted, whichever comes first. 
 Reserve Prices: The government also reserves the right to reject offers that it 
deems to be unacceptably high, i.e. the maximum payment is capped at $100 for 
each security. 
 
Instructions, Page 3 of 6 
 Cutoff Normalized Price: As just explained, offers with lower normalized bid 
prices will be accepted, and offers with high normalized bid prices will be 
rejected. The cutoff normalized price is the lowest normalized bid price among 
the rejected bids. This cutoff is like a market-clearing price, and it determines the 
price paid for all of the bids that have been accepted. To summarize, bids with 
normalized bid prices below the cutoff are accepted, and those at or above the 
cutoff are rejected. 
 Uniform Sale Price: For a given security, the government will purchase all 
accepted contracts at the same price: Uniform Price = (cutoff normalized 
price)*(reference price) for each contract of that security. Note that the price 
paid for two different securities will differ, since the reference prices of the two 
securities will generally be different. 
 Example 1: Suppose that there is a bid price of 50 for a security with reference 
price of 2, and a bid price of 80 for a security with a reference price of 4. These 
bids have normalized prices of 50/2 = 25 and 80/4 = 20 respectively, so the 80 bid 
(with the lower normalized price) is more likely to be accepted. If this is the only 
accepted bid, the normalized price of 25 for the rejected bid of 50 is the cutoff 
normalized price. Thus contracts associated with the accepted bid of 80 would be 
sold for 25 times the reference price of 4 or for 100 per contract. 
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 Earnings: The amount you receive for a sale is at least as high as your bid, since 
all accepted bids have normalized prices that are at or below the cutoff 
normalized price. If a bid is not accepted, you earn nothing for those contracts. If 
a bid is accepted, the difference between the sale price and the value of the 
security will be added to you earnings. Thus you will be penalized if you sell 
below value, and you will earn more to the extent that your sale is above value 
(revealed after the auction). 
 
Instructions, Page 4 of 6 
 Example 2: Suppose there are bids on 4 different securities, some with high 
prices and some low, but the normalized bids are ranked at 8, 9, 11, and 14. If the 
auction budget is such that only the bids with the two lowest normalized bid 
prices are accepted, then the cutoff normalized price for the first rejected bid is 
11, and each of the two bids with low ratios result in sales for amounts that equal 
11 times the relevant reference prices. If the accepted bids were 16 with reference 
price 2 and 9 with reference price 1, then the bid of 16 will result in a sale at 22 = 
(11)*(2), and the bid of 9 will result in a sale at 11 = (11)*(1).  
Bid Price Reference Price Normalized Bid Sale Price 
16 2 8 = 16/2 22 = (11)*(2) 
9 1 9 = 9/1 11 = (11)*(1) 
11 1 11 = 11/1 (no sale at cutoff) 
7 0.5 14 = 7/(.5)  (no sale) 
 Note: What you receive for an accepted bid is not affected by the bid price. But 
bidding too high can be risky since a high bid is less likely to be accepted. 
Conversely, if a low bid is accepted, you will receive an amount at least this high, 
but bidding too low can be risky since the amount received could be as low as 
what you bid. You incur a loss if you sell contracts below their values (revealed 
after the auction). 
 Earnings Example: If the true security values for the bids in the top two rows of 
the table turned out to be 20 and 10, then earnings would be $22 (sale price) - $20 
(value) = $2 for the bid in the top row and $11 (sale price) - $10 (value) = $1 for 
the bid in the second row. Earnings are 0 for bids that are not accepted (bottom 
two rows). But if the values for the securities in the top two rows were 24 and 12, 
then earnings for these bids would have been negative: $22 - $24 = -$2 and $11 - 
$12 = -$1. 
 
 36
Instructions, Page 5 of 6 
 Values: The table below provides an example of your signal values and contract 
holdings for each of the 6 securities. The signal values are estimates and may turn 
out to differ from the actual values that are realized after the auction. 
 Value Range: All security values are between $0 and $100, so you can think of 
bidding in terms of "dollars per hundred of par value" and the contracts as being 
par value amounts. 
 Value Distributions: The value of any given security will be drawn randomly 
from a range between lower and upper bounds, with all values in that range being 
equally likely. For example, if the range is from 20 to 80, then the value of the 
security may be 20, 21, ... 80, as if the value were determined by a hard spin of a 
roulette wheel with stops labeled for each possible value in this range. The upper 
and lower bounds for the security value ranges will be shown in a table that you 
can look at while selecting your bids. 
 Signal Values: Your signal for a given security is drawn randomly from a range 
between $10.00 below the true value to $10.00 above the true value. All signals in 
the interval are equally likely. The signals received by others about the value of a 
given security will be drawn randomly in the same manner. The range of possible 
signal draws for a more valuable security will be higher than the range for a less 
valuable security. 
 High or Low Signals: If you have a high signal value for a given security, it 
could be because your signal draw was high in the interval of possible signals, or 
it could be because the signal draws for all bidders are high relative to those of 
other less valuable securities. Conversely, all bidders' signal draws will tend to be 
low for a less valuable security. 
 Reference prices: For each security, the government receives a signal drawn 
from between $20 below the true value and $20 above the true value. The 
government then calculates the reference price by dividing its signal for each 
security by its signal for security A. For instance, if the government signals are 60 
and 30 for securities A and B, then the reference prices are 1 (=60/60) for A and 
0.5 (=30/60) for B. Note that a higher reference price will generally correspond to 
a more valuable security, but reference prices are subject to error since the 
government receives imperfect signals about security values. 
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Security 
Code 
Reference Price
(per contract) 
Contracts
Owned 
Value
Signal
A $*.** ** $*.** 
B $*.** ** $*.** 
C $*.** ** $*.** 
D $*.** ** $*.** 
E $*.** ** $*.** 
F $*.** ** $*.** 
 
Summary Page 
 Bids specify the price at which you are offering to sell contracts of a specific 
security. 
 Different bids (offers to sell) may be submitted for different contracts of a given 
security. Each bid specifies the security and the bid price for a single contract. 
 In order to compare bids for different securities in a combined auction, all bids are 
divided by pre-announced reference prices and the resulting normalized bids for 
all securities are ranked together; those with low normalized bids are more likely 
to be accepted. 
 A fixed budget of $2,000.00 is used to purchase the securities to be accepted, 
beginning with the lowest normalized bids and working up sequentially until the 
budget is exhausted (with ties at the cutoff decided at random). 
 The cutoff normalized bid for the first rejected bid is used to determine the sale 
price for all bids with normalized bids below the cutoff. This cutoff normalized 
bid is the same for all securities. 
 Sale Price = (Cutoff Normalized Bid) * (Reference Price), so all successful 
bidders will receive the same amounts per contract of a given security, regardless 
of their actual bid amounts. 
 The sale price for an accepted bid is at least as high as the bid, since the 
normalized bid for an accepted bid will be at or below the cutoff normalized bid. 
 Earnings equal the difference between the revenues from contracts that are sold 
and their values (revealed after the auction). You earn nothing on contracts not 
sold. 
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 Values for each security will be drawn randomly from a range that is between $20 
and $80. 
 Signals for each security will be taken from a range that is within plus or minus 
$10.00 of its actual value. 
 For each security, the government receives a signal that is within plus or minus 
$20.00 of its true value. Dividing this signal by the government's signal for 
security A gives the reference price of the security. 
 There is only a single round of bidding in the auction. Bids may not be revised 
once submitted. 
 There will be 8 auctions, and your security values and signal value estimates will 
be randomly regenerated for each new auction. The program will keep track of 
your total earnings for all auctions. 
 Special Earnings Announcement: Your cash earnings will be 5% of your total 
earnings at the end of the experiment. 
